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Introduction
Within classical psychoanalysis or the drive-orientated 
theory as first proposed by Freud and later early object 
relations theorists such as Klein and Fairbairn, the notion 
of projection was used to explain prejudice. Projection 
was first put forward by Klein (1935) and Fairbairn 
(1943, 1952) and later developed by Bion (1967) to be the 
externalisation of the unwanted within, or the repressed 
bad object, onto the external other. Projection was seen 
as the psychological act of the self in getting rid of that 
which is psychologically intolerable and thus unacceptable 
within. It was viewed as a method of psychically managing 
the unwanted aspects of the self by expulsion onto another. 
Projection as a concept used to explore prejudice is, in 
some areas, currently still used in psychoanalytic literature 
(Akhtar, 2001; Friedman, 2007; Hollander, 2009, 2010). 
For example, Friedman, (2007, p. 32) highlights this link 
between projection and prejudice when he commented that 
“all malignant prejudice is due to toxic introjects projected 
onto scapegoats, who are then feared or hated, or both. The 
repressed bad object in the person who becomes a bigot 
‘returns’ and is projected onto the external screen of those 
who have been dehumanized by negative myths”. 
I view the use of projection to understand prejudice 
to be limited. To this end, there have been profound 
paradigmatic shifts in psychoanalysis which demand a 
fuller understanding of prejudice. One such major shift 
is the move from a purely intrapsychic approach to a 
relational approach in the development of self, and thus to 
a self that is formed in and through the real and imagined 
interactions of others. In this context, the intrapsychic act 
of projection becomes conceptually less a focus while 
the self-other matrix in relation to the development of the 
self takes central stage in the unfolding understanding 
of prejudice. Within this major paradigmatic shift from 
the classical psychoanalytic intrapsychic development 
of the self to the relational tilt in psychoanalysis (Aron, 
1996; Mitchell, 1988) with its emphasis on the relational 
development of the self, I suggest that prejudice emerges 
from the development of the self-in-relation to the other. 
I therefore fundamentally move away from the classical 
object relations theories of Klein and Fairbairn and their 
work on projection to the ideas of eminent psychoanalyst 
Heinz Kohut’s (1966, 1971, 1977, 1984; Kohut & Wolf, 
1978) and his followers. From within his views of the 
development of self in relation to the other, as espoused 
by his well-known theory of the self or what is now termed 
self psychology, I suggest that prejudice is an outcome of 
self-development and the need to differentiate and separate 
from and thus prejudice becomes an act of self-definition. 
Conversely, the current social-cultural understanding 
of prejudice as opposed to the psychoanalytic approach 
is that prejudice develops through social interaction with 
others, and thus it is an interpersonal, interactional social 
event where an out-group and an in-group are identified, 
and where the out-group is evaluated negatively (Dovidio, 
Glick, & Rudman, 2005; Ekehammar, Akrami, & Araya, 
2003; Guimond, Dambrun, Michinov, & Duarte, 2003; 
Hodson, Dovidio, Gaertner, 2002; Saucier, Miller & 
Doucet, 2005; Tajfel, 1969, 1970, 1978, 1982; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979). It is suggested that the social world and, 
by implication, the world of the other plays a major role 
in identity and thus, as indicated above, self-definition in 
terms of the development of an “us and them” and thus 
the development of prejudice. If prejudice is an act of 
self-definition, the implication is that the psychological 
and the social understanding of prejudice cannot be 
easily separated from each other because the self (as a 
psychological unit) cannot be easily separated from the 
social. This idea of the role of the self and self-definition 
within the psycho-social world in terms of the construction 
of prejudice needs to be further investigated. 
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The aim of this article
The self as a psychological construct, and the self in 
relation to the other has been discussed in psychological 
and sociological literature for decades, but not much 
attention has been given to the psychological development 
of the self in relation to the social construction of prejudice. 
The primary aim of this article is to explore the self in 
prejudice and thus the psychological processes involved 
in the development of self within the social context. I use 
the conceptual framework of Kohut’s Self psychology as 
a lens to present the development of the self and thus the 
idea of self in relation to the other. In such an exploration 
of self in prejudice, I present some of my ideas, which 
include prejudice as an outcome of self-definition in the 
context of the other, as well as linking self in prejudice 
and group dynamics to attachment theory and the notion 
of “selfgroup” in terms of over-identification with the 
in-group.
Social theories of prejudice
The scientific study of prejudice has been a subject matter 
within social psychology and thus pursued uninterruptedly 
since the introduction of the first investigations into what 
we now understand as intergroup behaviour and attitudes. 
The work of early writers such as Bogardus (1925), 
Thurstone (1928), Adorno, et al., (1950), Allport (1954, 
1962) and Bird (1957) began the first concentrated social-
cultural studies into prejudice. Today, arguably, it is theorist 
and social scientist, Thomas F. Pettigrew who has become 
distinctly synonymous with the on-going scientific study 
of prejudice. His (selected) work (1975, 1979, 1991, 1998, 
2011), together with colleagues, (1995, 2002, 2006, 2008, 
2011) on prejudice, discrimination, intergroup dynamics 
and racism has spanned several decades. Pettigrew has 
indicated that this (now) massive body of scientific work 
on prejudice is so extensive and comprehensive that it 
is now “unlikely to encounter completely new ideas” 
(Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014, p. 670). During these past 
decades, several theories have emerged that attempt to 
make sense of the intricacies and complexities of prejudice. 
From within the social psychology perspective, there are 
as many theories as there are definitions of prejudice. 
Pettigrew himself (Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014) refers 
to The Oxford English Dictionary for a concise definition 
of prejudice, which he obviously supports. This definition 
is: prejudice can be understood as “dislike, hostility, 
or unjust behaviour deriving from preconceived and 
unfounded opinions.” This definition, which Pettigrew 
highlights, also appropriately links prejudice to both hostile 
intergroup attitude and discriminatory behaviour. However, 
Pettigrew and others before him have made the distinction 
between discrimination and prejudice and show that the 
link between prejudicial attitude and discrimination is not 
always obligatory and to be assumed but it needs to be 
scientifically demonstrated (Allport, 1954, 1962; Brewer, 
1999; Gaertner et al., 1997; Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014). 
In addition, it is also understood that hostility is not always 
linked to discrimination (Nier & Gaertner, 2012a, 2012b): 
“we hold that discrimination does not require hostility” 
(Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014, p. 670). To this end, it was 
concluded that the many forms of discrimination that may 
develop, develop “not because outgroups are hated, but 
because positive emotions such as admiration, sympathy, 
and trust are reserved for the ingroup and withheld from 
outgroups” (Brewer, 1999, 438). The implication for 
this in-group favouritism is, according to Pettigrew and 
colleague, “the prime mechanism of discrimination” and 
they have gone a long way to demonstrate this phenomenon 
in their most recent work (Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014, p. 
760). When hostility or hostile prejudice is often linked to 
discrimination, however, it may do so without regard for 
in-group favourability (Wagner, Christ, & Pettigrew, 2008).
In the earlier years, socialisation theories developed in 
terms of prejudice, such as social identity theory, which 
can be defined as a person’s sense of who they are based on 
their membership to the group (Tajfel, 1969, 1978; Tajfel 
& Turner, 1979). In terms of social identity theory, identity 
is thus understood to be formed in and defined by the other, 
and thus identity-formation is always in the social context 
of the other. Identity or the “I-ness” of an individual is 
thus an out-growth of the interplay between the individual 
within in-group and thus by implication, the members of 
the out-group. The inference is that prejudice is about the 
negative relationship between the in-group and the out-
group. This is also important in terms of the psychology 
of identity and the sense of self within the group. As this 
article is about self in prejudice, identity becomes linked 
to self and self becomes a source of personhood in terms 
of group dynamics. 
Other more recent sociological studies on the nature 
of prejudice have been offered, such as the emphasis on 
the negative evaluation toward a particular out-group 
(Butz1 & Plant, 2009; Dovidio, Glick, & Rudman, 
2005; Ekehammar, Akrami, & Araya, 2003; Hodson, 
Dovidio, Gaertner, 2002; Saucier, Miller, Doucet, 2005). 
The implication is that the in-group is comprised of 
sameness and the out-group, of difference. It seems that 
people develop a sense of belonging in the in-group and 
identify with this group (Dovidio, et al., 2005; Heilman, 
& Haynes, 2008; Saucier, Miller, & Doucet, 2005; Tajfel 
& Turner, 1979). Outsiders are experienced as not the 
“same as” (different) and this perhaps explains Allport’s 
(1962) earlier observation of the preference for one’s own 
social group. From within the perspective of social identity 
theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) the self-concept is therefore 
established from membership to the relevant social in-
group. In this regard, social identity theory attempts to 
predict intergroup preferences and behaviours on the basis 
of perceived group status differences.
Self-categorisation theory (Reynolds et al., 2001), 
developed from the observations and core tenets of social 
identity theory, offers a comprehensive account of self in 
relation to the group and group processes. As this article 
focuses on the self in prejudice, how one defines oneself 
in relation to what is the same (in-group) and not the same 
(out-group) becomes important. Further socially-based 
distinctions of prejudice have been made; the so-called 
“old-fashioned” form characterised by obvious resentment 
and denunciation towards other groups and individuals, 
and the so-called “modern” form which is more subtle, 
indirect and clandestine (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Brown, 
1995; Duckitt, 1994; Guimond, Dambrun, Michinov, 
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& Duarte, 2003; Fiske, 2000; Saucier, Miller, Doucet, 
2005). More recently, the notion of prejudice has also 
been refined as either “malignant” or “benign” (Friedman, 
2007; Parens, 2007a, 2007b, 2012). From within this 
newer perspective, prejudice is studied as a dimension 
of cognitive behaviour that is fundamentally a judgment 
formed without evidence for such a judgement (Greenwald 
& Pettigrew, 2014; Hodson, Dovidio, Gaertner, 2002; 
Saucier, Miller, Doucet, 2005; Parens, 2007a, 2007b, 2012; 
Parens, et al., 2007). Prejudice is therefore concluded to 
be a premature conclusion without adequate knowledge 
and thus is most likely to be an inaccurate assumption 
of the other or out-group. From this perspective, the 
social process of prejudice against the out-group may be 
understood as a defensive mechanism against the loss 
of group identity. Hatred preserves both the in-group 
and out-group boundaries. Stephan and Stephan (1985) 
have shown that the role of threat in intergroup contact 
and the corresponding arousal of anxiety is important in 
understanding prejudice and fear of the other. It has been 
noted that a flurry of research was inspired by their analysis 
and that the idea of repeated intergroup contact could 
reduce intergroup threat and anxiety (Blascovich, Mendes, 
Hunter, Lickel, & Kowai-Bell, 2001; Paolini et al., 2004; 
Pettigrew, 1998; Stephan, Stephan, & Gudykunst, 1999; 
Stephan et al., 2002; Voci & Hewstone, 2003). However, 
this implies that prejudice could be reduced by information 
about the other and thus it was thought that contact with 
the other (out-group) could (simply) show how similar 
the other really is, and thus create a “what is there to be 
afraid of? – they are like us, you know” attitude. However, 
differences in the out-group were also diminished as a 
result of this approach (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2008). 
Self psychology and the development of the self: 
Self-definition as an act of prejudice
Self psychology, as developed originally by Kohut 
(1959, 1966, 1971, 1977, 1984; Kohut & Wolf, 1978) 
and his followers, offers an integrated view of normal 
development as well as the roots of psychopathology and 
the treatment or analytic process to assist in overcoming 
difficulties in living. His work on the self is both refreshing 
and innovative and falls within what is known as the 
relational tilt within psychoanalysis, the outflow of the 
emergence of paradigm shifts within psychoanalysis, as 
indicated earlier. One such paradigm shift (around about 
the 1950s) was essentially the discarding of the traditional 
view that there can be an objective reality and the observer 
can observe without being influenced by or influencing 
what is observed. In response to this paradigm shift, 
Kohut, first in 1959, updated psychoanalytic epistemology 
by focusing on its “method of observation” (Fosshage, 
2009). Kohut (1984) recognised “the relativity of our 
perceptions of reality,” and “the framework of ordering 
concepts that shape our observations and explanations” 
(p. 400) and that “the field that is observed, of necessity, 
includes the observer” (Kohut, 1984, p. 41). This view 
had profound implications for the theory and practice 
of psychoanalysis. The primary implication for analysis 
was that the therapeutic encounter between the two 
participants fundamentally becomes an encounter in which 
an intersubjective or relational field is created and that 
involves “the intersection of two subjectivities” (Atwood 
& Stolorow, 1984) and the “meeting of minds” (Aron, 
1996). In this context, subjectivity and the notion of other 
and the impact of other on experience itself and ultimately 
the sense of self became important and eventually 
objectivity became less trusted and valued. 
As a result of this first paradigm shift a second 
paradigm shift emerged – this was a transformation in 
epistemology from intrapsychic theory to relational field 
theory or intersubjective or, now, systems theory (Atwood 
& Stolorow, 1984; Fosshage, 2003, 2009; Mitchell, 1988). 
The implication was that the analyst could and does impact 
on the analysand and vice versa, meaning that in the 
development of the analytic material, what was discussed 
or made a part of the analysis was always a co-construction 
(intersubjectivity) of both the analyst and analysand (Aron, 
1996). The subsequent ongoing shifts and transition in 
paradigms, from an essentially positivistic to a relativistic 
science or from objectivism to constructivism, upset and 
unashamedly dethroned the analyst from a protected 
and privileged or elevated position of objectivity and 
unceremoniously confronted the analyst with an increasing 
recognition not only of the influence of their own 
subjectivity in constructing interpretations but also of their 
participation in co-creating while the patient’s subjectivity 
remained the principal core focus of the analytic process 
(Fosshage, 2009). 
From within this new approach in psychoanalysis, it 
can be seen that the analytic encounter of the two persons 
(as opposed to the one-person psychology of classical 
psychoanalysis) and what developed between them 
could not be separated out. The implication was that the 
development and experience of the self (both inside and 
outside of therapy) was always in relation to the other. 
This second paradigm shift in psychoanalysis produced 
thinkers and writers that acknowledged this relational tilt 
in psychoanalysis. This idea of relational as central to 
the development of self as well as the co-construction of 
the analytic material was crystallised with the pioneering 
thinking of several prominent psychoanalysts at that 
time, such as Sullivan (1953, 1954), who advocated the 
interactional and interpersonal nature of development 
and psychopathology, as well as the ground-breaking 
work of Mitchell (1988, 1993, 1997) on defining and 
highlighting relational concepts in psychoanalysis, 
psychoanalyst Bowlby (1973, 1980, 1982, 1988) on 
attachment theory with its focus on the emotional and 
psychological attachment patterns individuals create in 
order to have meaningful connections with others, and 
thus on attachment patterns that may become unhealthy or 
maladaptive and that give rise to pathology, and finally, the 
emphasis by psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott on the social 
context of the developing infant and that there is no such 
thing as a baby except in relation to the mother (Winnicott, 
1975a, 1975b). Self psychology, with its emphasis on the 
self–selfobject matrix, has been viewed as structurally a 
relational theory that was one of the main contributors to 
this paradigm change (Fosshage, 2003, 2009). Common 
to these theorists’ ideas was the adoption of the relational 
approach, which essentially shifted away from the original 
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notion of drives to view motivation as the intrinsic 
and prewired need to connect with others, and thus the 
development of self was viewed as from within a social 
and thus relational or intersubjective milieu (Atwood & 
Stolorow, 1984; Mitchell, 1988). 
The relational perspective, in summary, ushered in an 
increasingly stronger focus within psychoanalysis on the 
development of self in relation to other. 
To this end, as a result of this second paradigm 
shift, many subsequent psychoanalytic theorists have 
increasingly emphasised that the development of the 
infantile self is within a social relational context – that of 
the mother-infant dyad and later self-other matrix (Bion, 
1967; Kohut, 1984; Winnicott, 1975a, 1975b). These 
theorists describe a process of early infantile development 
of the self that includes the active involvement of the 
other in such a way that the other acts like a holding 
function in which the infantile self can emerge. They 
describe how the infantile self is deeply connected 
to and reliant upon the mother for all psychological 
and physical needs, thus contributing to the relational 
tilt in psychoanalysis. During this delicate and early 
development time, there is a necessary psychological 
merger with the mother. Out of this merger with the 
mother, the infant does not have a sense of a separate self. 
In a way, the self of the mother is the self of the infant. 
The (mother) or other in this merger is experienced 
as the same. The infantile psychological process of 
self-development is one of moving from a primitive 
psychological state of undifferentiation (“my mother and 
I are the same and therefore there is no difference” or 
“you are an extension of me”) towards a psychological 
state of differentiation or psychic separateness from 
the mother, and thus the recognition of difference (“my 
mother and I are not the same and therefore there is 
difference” or “me versus not me”). 
This shift from sameness and melting merging to 
recognition of difference and the subsequent formation 
of boundaries between “me versus not me” ushers in the 
infantile sense of self-other (Bion, 1967; Mahler, Pine & 
Bergman, 1975; Winnicott, 1975a, 1975b). In this context, 
sameness and difference is established and the notion of 
other and thus difference becomes of utmost importance 
to this process of self-definition which, in its simplest 
meaning, is the separation from what was thought to be the 
same as (undifferentiation) to what is now perceived to be 
different from (differentiation), which forms the basis of 
prejudice. In other words, the infantile self develops from 
an experience of sameness to an experience of difference 
and therefore the recognition of a “me versus not me” 
experience. This idea can be expressed in the following 
way – “My sense of self develops from the recognition that 
I am not the same as my mother”. 
Thus I suggest that the recognition of difference is an 
act of self-definition, and this links to my idea that self-
definition is an act of prejudice. 
As indicated, Kohut’s (1977, 1984) self psychology, 
with its emphasis on the self–selfobject matrix was 
principally a relational theory of self (Fosshage, 2009). 
Kohut defined the core of development as the maturation of 
a “cohesive nuclear self”, imbued with basic strivings for 
recognition, affirmation, empowerment and achievement 
of success, as well as the development of idealised goals 
and ambitions, and the development of talents and skills 
(Kohut & Wolf, 1978). Later Kohut (1984) postulated 
a fundamental motivation underlying all personality 
development as a striving to develop, to grow, to strive “to 
realize its [the self’s] nuclear program in the course of its 
life span” (p. 42). This self was viewed as sustained by the 
“empathic response of others” who could meet the lifelong 
needs for affirmation, validation, and a sense of belonging, 
hence emphasising its relational core.
To expand on the above basic strivings of the self, 
Kohut (1971, 1977, 1984) conceptualised that the 
developing child had a psychological need for primarily 
two sets of experiences in relation to others or caretakers 
and thus within the framework of self–selfobject matrix. 
The first set of experiences was for the child to experience 
admiring and confirming responses from parents and others 
to his or her innate sense of grandiosity, specialness and 
greatness, perhaps illustrated like this – “I am special”. 
With appropriate responsiveness and validation or 
“mirroring’, Kohut emphasised that this early experience 
of feeling special and admired by others matures into self-
esteem, assertiveness, ambition, a healthy enjoyment of 
successes and the pursuit of interests and activities. A child 
thus needs to be acknowledged and affirmed (mirroring 
selfobject needs) by a parent or parental surrogates to feel 
worthwhile, loved and capable. A sense of capability and 
self-worth, in turn, promotes a drive to succeed and be 
ambitious (Fosshage, 2009). The developing child also has 
a need for closeness and support from an omnipotent source 
of strength or from a parental figure that is admired, looked 
up to, followed and copied, perhaps illustrated as – “you are 
special”. This is the second set of experiences a child needs. 
When the developing child finds and merges with this great 
or idealised figure these needs are transformed into ideals, 
ambitions, goals, values, and a healthy sense of respect and 
admiration for others. Transformation of early idealising 
needs also leads to the capacity for self-soothing and self-
comfort, which is important in the context of learning to 
independently manage adverse or negative experiences 
and distress. A child thus also needs from a parent a sense 
of protection, security and safety, and parents or parental 
surrogates who are people that have qualities a child 
admires, which are termed by Kohut idealising selfobject 
needs (Fosshage, 2009).
Kohut (1984) later refined and defined a further basic 
psychological need for “twinship” as the experience of 
alikeness, belonging, and kinship with others, whether it is 
as part of a family, community, or a nation – it gives rise 
to a sense of self in relation to the other. In this experience 
of alikeness or sameness, and thus to an extent, group 
connectedness and belonging, Kohut understood and viewed 
appropriate human intimacy and trust or closeness resulting 
in a psychological ability to translate a positive experience 
of twinship into developing one’s skills and abilities.
Kohut (1977) emphasised that the emergence of the 
self is relational in tone and dependent on the presence 
of others not only in childhood but throughout life and 
who provide experiences that give rise to and maintain 
a cohesive sense of self. These self-other experiences 
Journal of Psychology in Africa 465
that promote psychological growth in and through the 
other (object) and the development of a cohesive sense 
of self are called selfobject experiences, emphasising 
the interdependence between self and object. Selfobject 
refers to the internal, subjective experience of functions 
provided by others who are experienced as a needed part 
of the self and they therefore, in positive relations, provide 
experiences which produce the healthy development of 
a sense of self. These mirroring, idealising and twinship 
functions which facilitate the development of healthy 
narcissism underlie the development of a healthy sense 
of self-worth. In this process, selfobject functions initially 
provided by others are internalised to become self 
functions, a process Kohut (1984) termed transmuting 
internalisation.
Later Lichtenberg (1991) emphasised that the term 
selfobject refers less to a function than to “a vitalising 
affective experience”, crucial for maintaining a cohesive 
and vital sense of self. The term selfobject was thus 
subsequently redefined as a (self) vitalising experience 
that permitted individuals to experience a greater range 
or scope of experience, including solitary as well as 
relational experience (Fosshage, 2009; Lichtenberg, 1991; 
Lichtenberg, Lachmann, & Fosshage, 1992). Fosshage 
(2009, p. 5) later clarified this point to remark that 
“essentially we are referring to vitalizing and devitalizing 
experiences, a dimension of experience that is crucially 
important for the development and maintenance of a 
positive thriving sense of self”.
Fosshage (2009) asserts that despite his emergence 
from initially a classical analytic background, as shown in 
his earlier 1971 work, Kohut became increasingly drawn to 
and persuaded of the value of the development of the self as 
well as the development of object relations and postulated a 
narcissistic line of development separate and distinct from 
an object relational line of development. Fosshage also 
pointed out that in his book, The Restoration of the Self 
(1977), Kohut, while discarding drive and energy theory, 
rejected his notion of two separate lines of development 
and posited instead a supraordinate theory of the self. 
Kohut therefore came to believe that the development and 
maintenance of the self is the central developmental task for 
all of us, and that it is a life-long project.
The genesis of psychopathology within the relational 
approach of self psychology, important in terms of 
understanding prejudice, is no longer something based 
on an intrapsychic mechanism (and thus projection) but 
is, following the second paradigm shift, rooted in an 
interpersonal and relational milieu. In other words, “the 
origin of psychopathology lies in disturbances in the 
self-selfobject relations of childhood. When the child’s 
need for empathic responsiveness is not adequately met 
by caregivers, development becomes derailed, leading 
to structural deficits and pathological defenses. The 
latter are erected to safeguard or restore the fragile self 
and to prevent further fragmentation or traumatization” 
(Gardener, 1999, p. 46). 
A relational perspective refreshingly prevents placing 
the blame for problems in living on the individual patient 
(Fosshage, 2009) but it supports a patient empathically 
to understand how these problems emerged not out of 
an individual-in-isolation but out of their past relational 
experience with others. This links to attachment theory and 
the ways in which attachment patterns become maladaptive 
and cyclical in nature (Levenson, 2010) and give rise to 
problems in relating with others. 
To an extent, psychopathology within self psychology 
is an interpersonal event, and emerges from between 
(intersubjective) and within the social matrix and therefore 
has a relational genesis to problems in living rather than 
purely an intrapsychic one. From within this relational and 
self psychology approach, prejudice may be seen not as 
something emerging from an individual existing outside 
of a social context and thus isolated and alone, but as from 
the group dynamics in which the individual functions and 
lives.
Thus prejudice is a relational phenomenon grounded in 
the sense of self that develops in relation to the (adequate 
responsiveness) of the other. “The self-psychology model 
makes clear that we are interdependent with one another 
throughout our lives” (Fosshage, 2009, p. 5). Prejudice is 
thus the development of a social and relational dynamic 
and is a social concern rooted in a psychological self 
that has not had “good enough” mirroring or idealising 
selfobject experiences. The sense of self is deficient as a 
result of a lack of responsive and empathetic experience 
of selfobjects. Prejudice is therefore linked to selfobjects 
that give rise to a sense of self that is inadequate, unworthy 
and thus lacks self-esteem, the malignant or unhealthy 
development of narcissism. “Pathogenesis is understood 
as involving problematic parental responses that thwart 
selfobject needs and the development of a positive sense 
of self, creating, in turn, negative self-feelings and images” 
(Fosshage, 2009, p. 5). 
It has been noted by Fosshage (2009) that in 
psychoanalytic theory the analyst, as the other, is a 
participant in the therapeutic process and thus contributes 
to what may emerge.  As a result of this participation, the 
therapeutic relationship can be viewed of as a social one 
in which both participants are contributing and thus the 
analytical material is a co-construction. In the same way, 
prejudice, in the context of the social, is a co-construction; 
it requires the participation of the other and thus emerges 
in the context of the other.
From within the self psychology approach to the 
development of self, to be prejudicial or to have prejudices 
is a way to make the other or out-group members feel 
inadequate. The self in prejudice is weakened by years 
of inadequate and lack of empathetic responses from 
caretakers, and thus prejudice is not an unconscious act as 
in the case of projection but a conscious and intentional act 
of a weakened sense of self seeking to find what is lacking 
within through the denigration of the other. 
Social processes involved in prejudice, identity 
development and the sense of self 
As indicated, the perspective of social identity theory, 
first developed by Tajfel (1969, 1978), describes the 
idea that groups (e.g. race, family, gender, religion) 
which people belong to provide a sense of self and self-
esteem. These social groups thus give an individual a 
sense of social identity which then results in a sense of 
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belonging to the social world. Groups are structured 
according to in-groups and out-groups and thus there 
is immediately a sense of some individuals that don’t 
belong to the group while others do (Hogg & Abrams, 
1988; Hodson, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2002; Saucier, 
Miller, & Doucet, 2005; Tajfel, 1969). If this notion is 
developed further, the sense of identity is maintained by 
both the psychology of the in-group and the out-group 
because both highlight that which is “the same” and “not 
the same” thus emphasising the compartmentalisation of 
prejudice into an “us” and “them” The development of the 
prejudice in relation to the development of the self and the 
so-called twinship process described earlier implies that 
the psychology of identifications with the in-group often 
falls along a continuum from minimal identification to 
overidentification (Aviram, 2007; Ekehammar, Akrami, 
& Araya, 2003). When there is overidentification with 
the chosen in-group, there is a necessary heightened 
psychological awareness of the characteristics of the in-
group and a sharp sensitivity towards being a member 
because the sense of self is locked into being a part of the 
in-group. This overidentification can result in a paranoid 
fear of rejection because such loss of membership may 
mean loss of self (Aviram, 2007). The implication is that 
social identification can range from, on the one hand, 
mild to moderate levels of identification with the broader 
group, while on the other hand, to the extreme, that being 
overidentification with the group. Thus is can be said that 
one can move from identification to overidentification 
within the social group (Aviram, 2007).
From a developmental psychology perspective, I 
suggest that attachment theory (Bowlby, 1973, 1980, 1982, 
1988) may be linked to the idea described above of social 
identification with the group. Attachment theory describes 
a continuum of dependency patterns from extreme 
dependency to overdependence. Taking attachment theory 
and linking this to social identification patterns, the links 
between the two can be described of as along a continuum 
from dependency/identification to over-dependency/
overidentification with the group. 
If this idea of attachment to essentially the in-group 
and thus sameness is extended, it appears that there is 
some evidence that prejudice may be a consequence of a 
preference to be with the same and thus to belong to the 
in-group while evaluating the out-group in a negative 
manner (Aviram, 2007; Hollander, 2009, 2010; Hodson, 
Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2002; Saucier, Miller, & Doucet, 
2005; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The implication is that 
prejudice can be viewed along a continuum from benign 
to malignant, and that it can become malignant when the 
self, as a defence mechanism, overidentifies with the in-
group because it perceives a threat of loss of self by the 
out-group. This attachment and preference for sameness 
is a negative judgement towards difference: if prejudice 
is a consequence of a preference to be with the same, by 
implication, it is difference that defines sameness. 
In this regard, identity can be established by and 
through the group and thus identity can be a collective 
identity (Erikson, 1959; Guimond, et al., 2003; Tajfel, 
1969, 1978). The inference for the development of 
prejudice is that people categorise themselves into groups 
of sameness versus difference in order to develop a sense 
of self and figure out their place in that world of sameness 
and difference (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1969). This 
links to the self psychology notion of the development of 
the self as needing experiences of alikeness, sameness and 
belonging, whether to a family or the wider group of the 
community and nation. The experiences of mirroring and 
idealising from within the group itself cements the sense of 
self-worth and the development of skills and talents, and in 
this way, these selfobject experiences inside the in-group 
allow for the manufacture of a sense of loyalty, allegiance 
and belonging to the greater whole. 
If self-categorisation theory suggests that people 
categorise themselves into groups (Reynolds et al., 2001), it 
means that these group identifications are context-driven so 
that when collective identity is important to the individual, 
self-definition is dependent upon being a group member, 
and distinctions or categories are made along social lines 
such as race, gender, or religion (Aviram, 2007). When this 
happens, depersonalisation occurs, as collective identity is 
accentuated, which reduces differences between in-group 
members and stresses differences with out-group members 
(Aviram, 2007; Verkuyten & Hagendoorn, 1998). In this 
light, an individual whose collective identity is prioritised 
gives rise to the idea of the uniqueness of the individual 
as effectively diminished in service of the collective. In 
this case, the group is overidentified with and replaces 
individual identity in favour of a collective identity. In this 
context, the self obtains a sense of meaning from being in 
the group, and thus the psychology of the group means that 
self-is-the-group. Without the group there is no identity, 
and thus no sense of having a place in the world. 
Furthermore, with regards to the self within the group, 
psychoanalyst Fairbairn (1935) suggested that there was a 
close link between the self/individual and the social world 
and proposed that the first social group into which we are 
born is the family. He asserted that we obtain our identity 
from the psychodynamics of the family constellation, and 
this normally involves the development of emotional ties 
which later become templates for emotional attachment 
to others in adulthood. He further suggested that the 
community and the in-group become substitutes for the 
original family group, and early attachment patterns are 
also later repeated in subsequent social identifications with 
social groups. The suggestion underlying this observation 
is that this social and psychological repetition of patterns 
is essentially the transference of the social and socialised 
ways of being and relating onto adult relationships. This 
links back to attachment theory mentioned earlier, which 
emphasises early attachment patterns specifically to 
sameness and members of the in-group. Consequently, 
social bonding is central to the sense of self (Aviram, 2002; 
Erikson, 1968; Tajfel, 1969). 
Aviram (2007, p. 6) upholds the idea that primary 
identification with the group may be a defence mechanism 
“to compensate for the experienced inadequacy of the 
infantile character”. The consequence of this results in 
an overidentification with the group because the group 
“provides an emotional experience of self” (p. 6). In this 
experience of overidentification with the group, the self is 
essentially lost. In this context, I use the term selfgroup (in 
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a similar way that Kohut (1977) used the term selfobject) 
to explain the psychological union or merger of the self 
with the group, in which the group not only provides an 
experience of the self but functions as the self. In this 
regard, there is a psychological state of union and this can 
be stated in the following way: “the group is me”. This 
notion links to the idea that the group is important not only 
because it “provides an emotional experience of self” but 
also because it provides a sense of identity (Erikson, 1968). 
Erikson (1959, p. 97) understood the phenomenon of 
overidentification with an in-group in adolescence and 
indicated that it was “to the point of apparent complete loss 
of identity … they become remarkably clannish, intolerant, 
and cruel in their exclusion of others who are ‘different’ 
in skin color or cultural background”. The consequence 
of this clannish mentality is that the out-group is not only 
side-lined but hated. This overidentification with the in-
group, however, is not limited to adolescence (Bettelheim 
& Janowitz, 1963; Erikson, 1959). Bettelheim and 
Janowitz, (1963) emphasised that this overidentification 
is a kind of reparation for an insubstantial sense of self. 
If the in-group can be hated, then the in-group can be 
loved because it preserves a sense of self, at least to some 
extent. Erikson (1959) pointed out that such glorification 
of the in-group is a defensive act against a sense of identity 
confusion. Thus prejudice against the out-group can be 
understood as a way of preserving the in-group identity, 
and in this way, hate enforces boundaries between out-
group and in-group membership and hate protects against 
loss of self. The psychological strategies of idealisation 
and devaluation parallel perceptions of in-groups and 
out-groups, and any threat of annihilation of self that is 
experienced within the group is protected through various 
defensive mechanisms, of which prejudice is one strategy 
(Aviram, 2007).
Erikson (1968) developed a theory of human 
development that was divided into stages linked to age and 
each stage had various psychological tasks to be achieved. 
He was acutely aware of the interconnection between the 
social world and the psychology of the individual. With 
reference to the stage of adolescence, he identified that this 
was a time of “identity formation versus role confusion”, 
and emphasised the need of the adolescent to separate 
from the family of origin in favour of a new group made 
up of peer members. This new peer group enhanced and 
facilitated the further formation of identity. Here the 
adolescent not only thrusts away from but also vigorously 
mutinies or rebels against the family group and their values 
and attitudes. The adolescent begins to experiment with life 
offerings and may create a new value system contrasting 
the family’s values and belief. It is a time of further 
maturing and the enmeshment into the lives of peers 
allows for the internalisation of the new values of the new 
group (Erikson, 1959, 1968). This idea of moving away 
from family to peer groups links to the work of Aviram 
(2002, 2005, 2007), who proposes that in some cases when 
identity formation is the primary developmental task, 
as in the case of Erikson’s adolescent stage of identity 
formation, group affiliations are overidentification.
In my view, this shift away from the family to the 
new group is a furthering of the developmental process 
of separation-individuation in that the young person 
undergoes a furthering of the differentiation process not 
between self and mother, but between self and family. 
Because the focus is on moving away from family to peers 
and discovering a new sense of self within the new group, 
and identifying with this new group, it could be suggested 
that the adolescent individuation process is a process of 
prejudice in the sense of evaluating what is now the new 
in-group and thus disparaging the old (family) out-group. 
The movement the one group (family) to the other new 
group (adolescent group) is a necessary psychological shift 
in that it heightens the importance of the social nature of 
the new group in terms of the role it provides for a sense 
of identity.
Conclusion
In this article, prejudice has been defined as the negative 
evaluation of others, which is based on an erroneous 
assumption of the other because the data available 
regarding the other is largely ignored. This article has used 
the psychoanalytic and social processes to understand the 
processes involved in prejudice. Within the psychoanalytic 
approach, the use of Kohut’s self psychology was adopted 
as a lens through which to understand the development of 
self and thus the self in prejudice. Using both approaches, 
some new thoughts on the development of prejudice 
have been presented. These thoughts are that the use of 
attachment theory and thus patterns of attachment from 
dependency to over-dependency can be linked to levels of 
intensity of prejudice which fall along a continuum from 
the identification to over-identification. Moreover, self-
definition is a process of categorising what is the same 
and what is not the same – thus in terms of the definition 
of prejudice, it is suggested that self-definition is in itself 
an act of prejudice. Making use of the psychoanalytic 
term selfobjects, derived from self psychology, it is also 
suggested that when the individual intensely merges with 
the group (overidentification) to the extent that the self is 
lost within the group, a state of selfgroup develops. This 
means that the boundaries between self and the group are 
blurred. In this context, the group becomes vital to the 
sense of self, and so prejudice is high or intense towards 
the out-group which is viewed as a threat to the sense of 
self. Linked to this view is that the hostility for the out-
group can be understood as a defence against loss of 
self. Thus hostility masks the fear of the threat of self 
disintegration posed by the out-group. The fragile sense 
of self, like a borderline character, needs to merge with the 
group in order to have a sense of self. Without the group, 
there is no self. If the in-group is potentially threatened 
with disintegration, it translates into a threat of self 
destruction and thus loss of self. 
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